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IN THE SUMMER OF 2004 a dozen Democratic Members of the
House of Representatives asked the United Nations to monitor the
2004 Presidential election.1 After these efforts stalled in the House,
Secretary of State Colin Powell invited the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe to observe the Presidential election-for
the first time in history.2 These efforts to seek outside monitors for a
United States Presidential election underscored the deep concerns re-
garding the U.S. voting system in the wake of the 2000 Presidential
election. 3 Nevertheless, despite predictions that the 2004 Presidential
election would be the most litigious election in history,4 causing the
election to be decided by lawyers not voters, on November 3, 2004, the
day after the election, Democratic nominee John Kerry conceded that
he had lost the election to President George W. Bush.
Despite the apparent resolution that Bush had defeated Kerry,
questions regarding the 2004 election remained. For the second time
in U.S. history since 1877, there was a formal challenge to the certifi-
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cation of the electoral votes from one key state-Ohio. 5 This formal
challenge caused a two-hour debate in both houses of Congress. 6 The
debate, led by Senator Barbara Boxer from California focused on the
"fight for electoral justice."7 Issues debated included, inter alia, why
poor and predominantly African-American communities had to wait a
disproportionate amount of time in line to vote8 and why voting ma-
chines in one predominantly African-American district in Franklin
County used 2,798 voting machines when election officials stated that
they needed 5,000.9 By challenging electoral vote certification, Sena-
tor Boxer and Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones were attempt-
ing to cast light on the truth of a flawed system riddled with voting
irregularities. 10 Although the challenge did not change the outcome
of the Presidential election-indeed, it was never in doubt-the ob-
jection was nevertheless made because, as Congresswoman Tubbs
Jones stated on the House floor, it was "the only immediate avenue to
bring these causes to light."11
The formal challenge led by Senator Boxer and Congresswoman
Tubbs Jones brought to Congress the issue of an imperfect voting sys-
tem in the United States. The battle over improving the system to en-
sure compliance with the constitutional mandate that "all qualified
voters have a protected right 'to cast their ballots and have them
counted,"' 12 however, had been waged well before it reached Con-
gress in 2004. One year earlier, issues similar to those discussed in the
congressional challenge to the 2004 certification of Ohio's electoral
votes were raised in the context of the California's gubernatorial re-
call election. Specifically, opponents of the recall election charged
that California's voting system was flawed due to the use of pre-scored
punch-card balloting machines, which resulted in the undercounting
of minority votes. Thus, the question arose in California regarding
whether to let a gubernatorial recall election proceed in the face of
constitutional and statutory challenges.
5. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & James Dao, Congress Ratifies Bush Victory After a Rare Chal-
lenge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A16.
6. See id.
7. Press Release, Sen. Barbara Boxer, Statement on Her Objection to the Certifica-
tion of Ohio's Electoral Votes (Jan. 5, 2005), available at http://boxer.senate.gov/news/




11. Charles Babington & Brian Faler, Congress Makes Re-election Official; Two Lawmakers
Raise Obection to Ohio Balloting, WASH. PosT, Jan. 7, 2005, at A4.
12. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (citation omitted).
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The legal challenge to the California recall election was waged in
the case of Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley.13 On Au-
gust 7, 2003, plaintiffs filed suit to delay the recall election until it
could be conducted without pre-scored punch-card balloting ma-
chines.14 The plaintiffs argued that the use of pre-scored punch-card
ballots violated both the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion 15 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.16 They contended that the
use of pre-scored punch-card ballots disproportionately disen-
franchised minority voters because the results of the machines are less
reliable and are used in counties with higher populations of minority
voters.17 Finding that the possibility of success on the merits of the
Voting Rights Act violation did not outweigh the hardship of postpon-
ing the election, the Ninth Circuit allowed the recall election to pro-
ceed on October 7, 2003.18
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit's decision to allow
the California recall election to proceed was wrong; when future
courts grapple with issuing injunctions to prevent constitutional and
statutory violations, they must take into consideration the type of elec-
tion at issue and exactly what is at stake. In balancing the likelihood of
success on the merits with the hardships of issuing an injunction, the
courts must recognize that the balance weighs in favor of not issuing
an injunction only when the hardships that follow from postponing an
election are greater than merely having to re-send absentee ballots
and require candidates to campaign longer.
Part I of this Comment provides the necessary background on the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v.
Gore.19 Part II introduces and discusses the Ninth Circuit case of South-
west Voter Registratior Educ. Project v. Shelley. Part III comments on the
Ninth Circuit's refusal to acknowledge the systematic disenfranchise-
ment of minority voters caused by the use of punch-card voting ma-
chines. Part III also critiques how the court applied judicial precedent
regarding the use of injunctions in elections. Finally, Part III argues
that the court improperly allowed practical concerns regarding the
13. 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003).
14. See id. at 917.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
16. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
17. Appellants' Opening Brief at 2, Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v.
Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-56498).
18. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F. 3d at 919.
19. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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expense and work that went into the election to outweigh the consti-
tutional and statutory violations at bar.
I. Background: The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Bush v.
Gore
A. The Voting Rights Act of 1965
The Voting Rights Act of 196520 was designed to effectuate the
guarantee under the Constitution's Fifteenth Amendment that no citi-
zen's right to vote shall be denied or abridged on the basis of race,
color, or previous servitude. 2' The Voting Rights Act has been de-
scribed as "the most successful piece of federal civil rights legislation
ever enacted." 22 It is "a broad remedial statute," 23 which the Supreme
Court has emphasized "should be interpreted in a manner that pro-
vides 'the broadest possible scope' in combating racial discrimina-
tion."2 4 Specifically, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits any
practice or procedure that, interacting with social and historical con-
ditions, impairs the ability of a protected class to elect its candidate of
choice on an equal basis with other voters.25
The Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982 to impose a "results"
test as the standard for determining state compliance with the Act,
thereby supplanting the "intent" standard previously articulated by
the Supreme Court. 26 In City of Mobile v. Bolden,27 Justice Stewart, writ-
ing for a plurality, stated that the language of Section 2 of the Act as
originally written incorporated the discriminatory intent standard that
was prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1982, however,
Congress amended Section 2 to no longer require a showing of intent
to discriminate to prove a violation of the Votifig Rights Act. 28 This
20. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
21. See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Elections § 38 (2004).
22. Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Role oftheJustice Department, in CoNrRoVERsIES IN
MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RGHTS Acr IN PERSPECrVE 52 (Bernard Grofman & Chan-
dler Davidson eds., 1992).
23. See Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 896 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
24. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1980) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969)).
25. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Elections § 38; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000) (establishing the
definition of a protected class by prohibiting "denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color"); id. § 1973b(f) (2) (adding
"language minority group" to the class of protected citizens).
26. See Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 809 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
27. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
28. See Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement of
Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 727, 747 (1998).
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amendment, known as the "results test," barred all voting qualifica-
tions, standards, practices, or procedures that result in a minority
group having "less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice."29
Generally, violations of the Voting Rights Act hinge on concerns
regarding reapportionment of legislative districts.30 The Supreme
Court, however, explained in Thornburg v. Gingles3' that Section 2 pro-
hibits "any ... practices or procedures which result in the denial or
abridgement of the right to vote of any citizen who is a member of a
protected class of racial and language minorities. ' 32 The Ninth Circuit
further elaborated, "Section 2 plainly provides that a voting practice
or procedure violates the [Voting Rights Act] when a plaintiff is able
to show, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the challenged
voting practice results in discrimination on account of race."3 3 There-
fore, a violation of Section 2 is established by a showing that "in the
totality of the circumstances" a particular state statute, policy, practice,
or standard results in the denial of equal opportunity to participate in
the process for selecting persons for public office or deciding public
issues.3 4
B. Punch-Card Balloting Machines: The Legacy of Bush v. Gore
On November 7, 2000, an NBC television announcement de-
clared that Presidential candidate Vice President Albert Gore had won
the crucial Florida electoral votes and thus the Presidential election.3 5
In the pre-dawn hours of the following morning, however, the media
then announced that it was actually Presidential candidate Texas Gov-
ernor George W. Bush who had won Florida's twenty-five electoral
votes and thus the Presidential election.36 Subsequent embarrassed
explanations revealed that the election in Florida, and therefore the
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
30. See 25 AM. JUR. 2) Elections § 38.
31. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). The protected class in Thornburg was a group of black citizens
of North Carolina who alleged that a redistricting scheme impaired their "ability to elect
representatives of their choice in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act." Id. at 35.
32. Id. at 43.
33. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
35. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, eroG v. hsuB: Through the Looking Glass 41-42 (Bruce
Ackerman ed., Yale Univ. Press 2002).
36. See id.
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nation, was too close to call.3 7 This spawned a barrage of litigation
which led to the United States Supreme Court decisions in Bush 138
and Bush v. Gore.
1. Bush I
On November 8, 2000, the Florida Division of Elections reported
that Governor Bush had received 2,909,135 votes and that Vice Presi-
dent Gore had received 2,907,351 votes, creating a margin of 1,784
votes in favor of Governor Bush.3 9 The margin of victory for Governor
Bush was less than half of a percent of the votes cast; therefore, an
automatic machine recount was conducted pursuant to the Florida
election code. 40 The automatic recount resulted in a reduction in the
margin between the two candidates, but still showed Governor Bush
winning the race. 41 Given the closeness of the election, the Florida
Democratic Executive Committee requested that manual recounts be
conducted in Broward, Palm Beach, and Volusia Counties pursuant to
Florida law.42 The Florida Division of Elections, at the request of the
Palm Beach Canvassing Board, then issued an advisory opinion stating
that the results of the manual recounts had to be received by 5:00
p.m. on November 14, 2000 in order to be included in the certifica-
tion of the statewide results.43 The Volusia County Canvassing Board
then filed suit in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District in
Leon County, Florida seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not
bound by the November 14th deadline.44 The trial court subsequently
ruled that under Florida law the deadline was mandatory, but that the
Volusia Board would be able to amend its returns and the Florida Sec-
retary of State could exercise her discretion in deciding to accept the
amended returns.45 The Volusia Board appealed this ruling to the
First District Court of Appeal. The Florida Secretary of State, mean-
while, announced that she would not accept the returns from the four
counties that requested the ability to file amended returns; instead
she would rely on the earlier certified totals.4 6 Vice President Gore
37. See id.
38. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) [hereinafter Bush
1].
39. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 101 (2000).
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. Palm Beach Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1225 (Fla. 2000).
43. Id. at 1225-26.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1226-27.
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and the Florida Democratic Party then filed a motion in the Circuit
Court of the Second Judicial District in Leon County seeking to com-
pel the Secretary to accept the amended returns. Following the Cir-
cuit Court's denial of the motion, Gore and the Democratic Party
appealed to the First District Court of Appeal which consolidated that
appeal with Volusia Board's appeal and certified both to the Florida
Supreme Court.4 7 On November 21, 2000 that court, in turn, set No-
vember 26, 2000 as the deadline for all recounts.4 s
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, in what
came to be known as Bush ,49 and on December 4, 2000 issued an
opinion vacating the Florida Supreme Court's decision, "finding con-
siderable uncertainty as to the grounds on which it was based."5 0 De-
spite this finding by the United States Supreme Court, on December
11, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court issued a decision on remand rein-
stating the deadline as November 26, 2000.51
2. Bush v. Gore
The United States Supreme Court had its final say on the 2000
election in Bush v. Gore,52 which arose from an action Gore filed sepa-
rately from his participation in the dispute regarding the deadline for
submission of electoral returns that ultimately led to Bush L Following
the Florida Supreme Court's original decision setting the November
26, 2000 submission deadline, the Florida Elections Canvassing Com-
mission certified the results of the election on that date and declared
Governor Bush to be the winner.5 3 The next day, Vice President Gore
filed another complaint contesting the November 26, 2000 certifica-
tion, this time because "receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejec-
tion of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt
the result of the election ' 54 constitutes grounds for contest. Gore
based his challenge on, inter alia, approximately 10,750 ballots in
Miami-Dade county and 3,300 ballots in Palm Beach county that the
punch-card counting machines failed to register as having cast a vote
for president.5 5 The circuit court denied relief stating that Vice Presi-
47. Id. at 1227.
48. Id. at 1240.
49. Bush I, 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
50. Id.
51. Palm Beach Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1290 (Fla. 2000).
52. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1258-59 (Fla. 2000).
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dent Gore failed to meet his burden of proof.56 Gore then appealed
to the First District Court of Appeal, which certified the issue to the
Florida Supreme Court.57
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in
part.58 The court held that the circuit court was correct in rejecting
the challenge to the results in Nassau and Palm Beach Counties be-
cause those votes were not, in the statutory sense, "legal votes."59 The
court also held, however, that Vice President Gore had satisfied his
burden with respect to his challenge to Miami-Dade County's failure
to tabulate, by manual count, 9,000 ballots on which the machines
had failed to detect a vote for President ("undervotes").60 The court
thereby ordered a hand recount of the 9,000 ballots in Miami-Dade
County. The court also determined that both Palm Beach and Miami-
Dade Counties, in their earlier manual recounts, had identified a net
gain of 215 and 168 legal votes for Vice President Gore.61 The Florida
Supreme Court then directed the circuit court to include the totals in
the certified results. 62
Governor Bush challenged the decision of the Florida Supreme
Court and the Supreme Court again granted certiorari in Bush v. Gore.
The Court addressed the issue of whether the Florida Supreme Court
violated Article II of the Constitution by establishing new standards
for resolving Presidential election contests.63 More importantly, the
Court considered whether the use of manual recounts conducted in
the absence of clear standards violates the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Constitution.64
In its decision in Bush v. Gore, the Court noted that the closeness
of the 2000 Presidential election "brought into sharp focus a com-
mon, if heretofore unnoticed, phenomenon. Nationwide statistics esti-
56. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98.
57. Id.
58. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1247.
59. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 101.
60. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1258-59. On November 19, 2000 the Palm Beach
Canvassing Board began a manual recount of the 10,750 ballots on which no vote was
registered by the punch-card counting machine. When the Florida Supreme Court issued
its decision in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris, 531 U.S. 70, setting the certifi-
cation deadline at November 26, 2000, the manual recount was suspended. At the time the
recount was stopped, approximately 9,000 of the 10,750 "undervote" ballots had not yet
been manually recounted. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1258-59.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98.
64. Id. at 102.
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mate that... 2% of ballots cast do not register a vote for President.
65
The Court focused on the importance of the right to vote and the
requirement that the State not "accord[ ] arbitrary and disparate
treatment to voters in different counties." 66 Noting the high failure
rate of punch card balloting machines, the Court predicted, "After the
current counting, it is likely legislative bodies nationwide will examine
ways to improve mechanisms and machinery for voting."
67
The Court ultimately held that the recount process approved by
the Florida Supreme Court was "inconsistent with the minimum pro-
cedures necessary to protect the fundamental right of each voter" and
halted the manual recall. This decision led to the certification of Gov-
ernor George Bush as the official winner of Florida's twenty-five elec-
toral votes, and Governor Bush was subsequently inaugurated as the
Forty-third President of the United States. 68 The decision brought
into focus the weaknesses of our voting machine system and its effect
on nationwide elections:
Bush v. Gore highlighted this soft underbelly of American elections,
just as it threw into high relief the peculiar operations of our elec-
toral college. It showed that different types of voting machines had
patterns of different sorts of failure rates. It elicited from the Su-
preme Court a decision in which seven justices at least decided that
the differential levels of participation were sufficient (with vastly
different consequences) to sustain equal protection challenges to
practices that heretofore had passed well underneath the constitu-
tional radar.69
Bush v. Gore is widely believed to be the most controversial judicial
decision heard by the Supreme Court in several decades.7 0 In fact,
eight months after the election a Fox News Poll showed that nearly
sixty percent of Americans had not "gotten over" how Bush won the
presidency and that people were still "angry."71
Some scholars assert that the Supreme Court should not have
granted certiorari in Bush I or Bush v. Gore because the questions were
not justiciable and should have been left to the Florida Legislature
65. Id. at 103.
66. Id. at 107.
67. Id. at 104.
68. See id. at 101.
69. CAsS R. SUNSTEIN & RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE VOTE, BUSH, GORE AND THE SUPREME
COURT (Univ. of Chicago Press 2002).
70. See MICHAEL MOORE, STUPID WHITE MEN ... AND OTHER SORRY EXCUSES FOR THE
STATE OF THE NATION xviii (Regan Books 2001).
71. Id.
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and ultimately to Congress. 72 Those who defend the Supreme Court's
decision to grant certiorari have countered by arguing that the uncer-
tainty following the Presidential election threatened political chaos
and the nation needed closure.78 Most critics, however, contend that
such defenses of Bush v. Gore encourage us to "[t] hrow the law out the
window and think about the 'good of the country.'- 74 The most preva-
lent critique of Bush v. Gore, however, is that it was the result not of a
principled legal analysis, but rather a political preference. As one
critic has stated, "[I] nstead of deciding the case in accordance with
pre-existing legal principles, fairly interpreted or even stretched if
need be, five Republican members of the Court decided the case in a
way that is recognizably nothing more than a naked expression of
these justices' preference for the Republican party. '75
The overwhelming criticism that followed in the wake of the Bush
v. Gore decision has left an open question regarding the legitimacy of
the decision and what effect it would have on future election ques-
tions. In turn, the 2000 Presidential election has forced the nation to
reconsider the full range of practices that surround elections. 76 Specif-
ically, what types of voting machines are acceptable? Do all voting ma-
chines need to be overhauled before we can move forward with
elections and guarantee with any degree of certainty that every vote
will count? If not, what amount of undercounting and overcounting
can exist and have an election be ruled legitimate?
The next major case to challenge the use of certain voting ma-
chines was Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v. Shelley,77 a
challenge to California's recall election held on October 7, 2003.
Plaintiffs in this case alleged both a violation of equal protection
under the Constitution and a violation of the Voting Rights Act due to
the use of the same problematic punch-card voting machines. 78
72. See CHARLES FRIED, AN UNREASONABLE REACTION TO A REASONABLE DECISION 9
(Bruce Ackerman ed., Yale Univ. Press 2002).
73. SeeJED RUBENFELD, NOT AS BAD AS P.ESSY, WORSE 21 (Bruce Ackerman ed., Yale
Univ. Press 2002).
74. Id.
75. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CAN THE RULE OF LAW SURVIVE BUSH v. GORE 11 (Bruce
Ackerman ed., Yale Univ. Press 2002).
76. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, WHITHER ELECTORAL REFORMS IN THE WAKE OF BUSH V. GORE
241 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 2002).
77. 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003).
78. Id. at 916.
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II. The Case: Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v.
Shelley
A. The Parties
In Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley79 the plaintiffs
included a number of individual organizations thatjoined together to
bring suit. The plaintiffs included Southwest Voter Registration Edu-
cation Project, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of
Greater Los Angeles, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, and the California State Conference of Branches. 8
0
The Southwest Voter Registration Education Project is an organi-
zation committed to educating Latino communities across the South-
west about the democratic process, the importance of voter
registration, and voter participation. 81 Its self-stated mission is "to po-
litically empower Latinos by increasing civic engagement in the Amer-
ican electoral system."8 2  The Southern Christian Leadership
Conference of Greater Los Angeles is an organization committed
" [i] n the spirit of Martin Luther King, Jr.... to bring about the prom-
ise of 'one nation, under God, INDIVISIBLE together with the com-
mitment to activate the 'strength to love' within the community of
humankind."8 3 The organization targets their efforts toward issues
such as quality, integrated education, and full political participation.8 4
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the
oldest civil rights organization in the United States, s5 sponsors a vari-
ety of programs to "make real the promise of America." 86 The aim of
their programs is to ensure, among other things, "civil rights compli-
ance, equitable treatment of all Americans under law . . .and fully
participatory democracy. 87 Additionally, the California State Confer-
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. See SouTHwEsT VOTER REGISTRATION EDUC. PROJECT, INFORMATION SHEET AND MIS-
SION STATEMENT (2004), at http://www.svrep.org/about-svrep.html (last accessed Apr. 6,
2004).
82. Id.
83. S. CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, MISSION STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVES at
http://www.sclcnational.org/net/content/item.aspx?mode=P&s=4682.0.12.2 6 0 7 (last ac-
cessed May 25, 2005).
84. See id.
85. See NAACP, TIMELINE, at http://www.naacp.org/about/abouthistory.html (last
accessed May 25, 2005).
86. NAACP, NAACP PROGRAMS, at http://www.naacp.org/programs/programs-in-
dex.html (last accessed May 25, 2005).
87. Id.
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ence of Branches is the California affiliate of the NAACP working spe-
cifically on the status of civil rights in California. 88
These plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction against the use of punch-card voting machines
in the recall election. 89 Plaintiffs sought the injunctive relief against
Kevin Shelley, in his official capacity of California Secretary of State.90
B. History of the Case
On August 7, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in federal court to
enjoin the use of pre-scored punch-card balloting machines in the up-
coming recall election. 91 The basis for their claim was that the
planned use of punch-card balloting machines violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the United States Constitution and Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.92 The United States District Court for the Central
District of California issued an order and opinion denying the request
for a preliminary injunction.9 3
In its opinion, the district court first assessed the validity of any
defenses to the claims asserted by the plaintiffs. 94 While the district
court did not ultimately rule on any defense, it did note that there was
"ample reason"95 to believe that the suit would be barred under the
doctrine of res judicata as a result of the earlier case of Common Cause
v. BillJones.96 In that case a number of the same plaintiffs as in South-
west Voter Registration Educ. Project made similar constitutional allega-
tions against the use of punch-card balloting machines in general and,
ultimately, obtained a Consent Decree banning the use of punch-card
balloting in California by March 2004.9 7 In addition to finding that
that the suit was barred under res judicata, the district court in South-
88. See CAL. STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP, CENTURY 21 WEBPAGE, at http://
www.ca-naacp.org/cgi-bin/publiccanaacp/default.asp (last accessed May 25, 2005).
89. Appellants' Opening Brief at 10, Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v.
Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-56498).
90. Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir.
2003).
91. See id. at 917.
92. See id. at 916.
93. Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (C.D.
Cal. 2003).
94. See id. at 1135-38.
95. Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
96. Common Cause v. Jones, No. 01-03470 SVW(RZX), 2002 WL 1766436 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 19, 2002).
97. Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 1135-37.
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west Voter Registration Educ. Project also found that the action was likely
barred by laches. 98
With regard to the merits of the plaintiffs claims, the district
court found that "[w]hile the Court assumes that Plaintiffs can show a
likelihood that the punch-card machines will suffer a higher error rate
than other technologies, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are not
likely to prevail on the merits of their claims."99 As to the equal protec-
tion claim, the district court first looked to Bush v. Gore as standing for
the proposition that a rational basis review should be used when ana-
lyzing the justifications for the use of punch-card balloting ma-
chines. 100 In the end the district court did not come to a conclusion
about the proper standard of review and held that "whatever the ap-
propriate standard of review, Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the
merits of their constitutional claim." 101 The district court found that
even if the plaintiffs could prove disparate treatment of voters
through the use of punch-card balloting machines, the State had a
compelling interest in holding the recall election on its originally-
scheduled date and that the use of punch-card balloting machines was
narrowly tailored to achieve this goal. 0 2
The district court similarly found that the plaintiffs had a "slim
chance" of prevailing on their Voting Rights Act claim.' 0 3 The court
listed the factors relevant to an analysis of an alleged violation of Sec-
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which include "a history of official
discrimination in the jurisdiction; racially polarized voting; the linger-
ing effects of prior discrimination; a lack of electoral success among
minority candidates; the comparative unresponsiveness of elected offi-
cials to the needs of minorities; and, whether the policy justification
for the challenged practice is 'tenuous.' "104 The court found that the
plaintiffs allegations were not "of the type contemplated by Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act," noting that of the above relevant factors,
the plaintiffs had cited only one.'0 5 Ultimately, the district court held
that while the plaintiffs' allegations might be able to support a claim
under the federal pleading rules, they were not able to show either a
probability of success on the merits nor substantial questions as to the
98. Id. at 1138.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1139-40.
101. Id. at 1141.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1143.
104. Id. at 1142.
105. Id.
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merits and, therefore, were not entitled to the injunctive relief that
they sought.10 6 Furthermore, the district court determined that al-
though the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury, the balance of
hardships and consideration of the public interest weighed in favor of
allowing the recall election to proceed. 107
On September 11, 2003, the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Cir-
cuit and the case was argued on an expedited basis to a three-judge
motions panel.10 8 On September 15, 2003, the panel granted an in-
junction that postponed the election.10 9 The panel first looked at the
precedent set by the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore
"Plaintiffs' claim presents almost precisely the same issue as the Court
considered in Bush, that is, whether unequal methods of counting
votes among counties constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause."110 The Ninth Circuit panel noted that "[i]n Bush, the Su-
preme Court held that using different standards for counting votes in
different counties across Florida violated the Equal Protection Clause"
and therefore using voting apparatus of different degrees of reliability
could lead to a similar outcome (i.e., a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause) in the instant case.111 The Ninth Circuit panel analyzed
the evidence put forth by the plaintiffs that demonstrated the unrelia-
bility of punch-card balloting machines when compared to other
methods of voteocounting and determined that the plaintiffs had "ten-
dered more than sufficient proof to satisfy [the] preliminary burden"
of showing "that the likelihood is such that, when considered with the
demonstrated hardship, a preliminary injunction should issue to pre-
serve the respective rights of the parties." 112 The panel, like the dis-
trict court, refrained from articulating what standard of constitutional
review should be applied, but ultimately held that "plaintiffs have
demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits regard-
less of the standard of review." 113 Finally, the Ninth Circuit panel de-
termined that neither resjudicata nor laches would bar the plaintiffs'
106. Id. at 1143.
107. Id. at 1143-45.
108. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.
2003).
109. See id. at 913.
110. Id. at 895.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 899.
113. Id. at 900.
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suit and that the district court had applied incorrect legal analyses to
these defenses.1 14
Given these findings, the Ninth Circuit panel granted the injunc-
tion and postponed the recall election. On rehearing, the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court and allowed the recall election to
proceed on October 7, 2003.115
C. The Plaintiffs' Contentions
In their appeal to the Ninth Circuit, plaintiffs argued that the
district court erred in denying plaintiffs request for preliminary in-
junction based on two main legal arguments: first, that their right to
equal protection was violated because voters in counties that use
punch-card machines would have a "comparatively lesser chance of
having their votes counted than voters in counties that use other tech-
nologies."'116 Second, that the counties that use the punch-card ma-
chines have greater minority populations, thus the use of the punch-
card machines "denies the right to vote on the basis of race, in viola-
tion of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act."117 Plaintiffs contended
that they demonstrated a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the
merits based on their showing that, inter alia, the use of obsolete
equipment would disproportionately disenfranchise minority voters at
a much higher rate than those of white citizens. 18 The plaintiffs re-
quested that the election be postponed until March 2004 when the
counties that used punch-card machines were scheduled to switch to
more reliable systems.119
Specifically, the plaintiffs pointed to statistics showing that punch-
card machines were used in six major counties-Los Angeles, Sacra-
mento, San Diego, Santa Clara, Solano, and Mendocino. 120 In these
six counties, people of color constitute forty-six percent of the popula-
tion, whereas they constitute only thirty-two percent of counties that
use more reliable voting machines.12 Further, African-Americans,
114. See id. at 901-07.
115. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 919 (9th
Cir. 2003).
116. See id. at 917.
117. See id.
118. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 40, Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v.
Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-56498).
119. See Alex Roth, Punch-card Cited in Voter Omissions; Recall Question Skipped More Often,
Study Finds, S. D. UNIoN-TRIB., Oct. 11, 2003, at Al.
120. Appellants' Opening Brief at 2, Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project (No. 03-
56498).
121. See id. at 44.
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Asian-Americans, and Latinos are all more likely to reside in punch-
card counties than are white voters.1 22
The plaintiffs claimed that the use of punch-card machines would
result in an average combined residual vote rate of 2.23%.123 Residual
votes consist of over-votes, ballots disqualified because they are read by
the machine as containing more than one vote on a single candidate
or issue, and under-votes, ballots disqualified because the machine
reads them as not containing a vote. 124 Due to these statistics, the
plaintiffs argued that they had put forth a likelihood of success on the
merits that the voting machines resulted in systematic disenfranchise-
ment of minority voters, in violation of both the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of
1965.125
D. The Decision
"The basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always
been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies." 126
Every request for injunctive relief is different, however, and "a court
must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the
effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested
relief."' 27 In Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project,128 the Ninth Cir-
cuit, on an en banc reconsideration, analyzed the various standards
they could use to determine whether the plaintiffs had demonstrated
the need for an injunction.
The court first considered their standard analysis that the plain-
tiffs demonstrate "either: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and
the possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) that serious questions going
to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in
[their] favor."129 When using this test, the court must also consider
122. See id. at 44, n.18. The six punch-card counties collectively have 9% African-Ameri-
cans, 11% Asian-Americans, and 27% Latinos. Comparatively, the counties with more relia-
ble voting systems have only 5% African-Americans, 8% Asian-Americans, and 19% Latinos.
Id.
123. See idat 44 n.19.
124. Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 917.
125. Appellants' Opening Brief at 52, Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project (No. 03-
56498).
126. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).
127. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531(1987).
128. 344 F.3d at 917-18.
129. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir.
2003) (quoting Walczak v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 198 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis
added).
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whether the public interest favors issuance of the injunction.130 The
court also contemplated an alternative analysis previously employed
by the Ninth Circuit that requires the plaintiff to establish: "(1) a
strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irrepara-
ble injury to plaintiff [s] if preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a bal-
ance of hardships favoring the plaintiff[s], and (4) advancement of
the public interest (in certain cases). "131 Ultimately, the court con-
cluded that these forms of analysis created a continuum, meaning that
the less certain the district court is of the likelihood of success on the
merits, the more the plaintiffs must convince the district court that
the public interest and balance of hardships tip in the plaintiffs
favor. 132
The Ninth Circuit, on an en banc reconsideration, held that the
plaintiffs failed to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits of
their violation of the Voting Rights Act claim and equal protection
claim, and therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to issue the injunction. 133 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
the district court was correct in ruling that plaintiffs would suffer no
hardship outweighing the stake of the State of California and its citi-
zens in having this election go forward as planned and as required by
the California Constitution. 134
The panel quoted Bush v. Gore as the leading case on disputed
elections: "The question before the Court is not whether local entities,
in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems for
implementing elections."13 5 Rather, the Ninth Circuit en banc panel
focused on their finding that the possibility of success on the merits of
the Voting Rights Act violation did not outweigh the hardship of post-
poning the election, affirmed the district court, and allowed the recall
to occur on October 7, 2003. 1 6
In applying the standard injunction analysis, the court missed the
unique elements of this case. Not only was this case different because
the injunction was desired to enjoin an election, but it was especially
unique because it involved a special recall election. The distinction is
significant because it goes to whether or not the hardships of granting
130. See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992).
131. Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis added).
132. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 918.
133. Id. at 920.
134. I. at 919-20.
135. Id. at 918 (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000)).
136. See id. at 919.
Spring 2005] INJUNCTIONS AND ELECTIONS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
the injunction were more significant than the likelihood of success on
the merits. Without a clear understanding of the unique elements of a
special election, such as the flexibility with regard to scheduling the
election and the lack of a constitutional crisis should the election be
postponed, the court is likely to overvalue the hardships of postpon-
ing an election and undervalue the high investment the voters have in
making certain that their vote will count.
In the future, when courts are grappling with issuing injunctions
to prevent constitutional and statutory violations, the court must fac-
tor in what type of election is involved and what exactly is at stake. In
balancing the likelihood of success on the merits with the hardships of
issuing the injunction, the courts must recognize that the right to vote
is so fundamental that the hardships that would follow from issuing an
injunction should be more significant than merely having to re-send
absentee ballots and require candidates to campaign longer.
III. Practical Consideration Trumps Sound Legal Analysis
A number of factors contributed to the Ninth Circuit's flawed de-
cision in Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley. The decision
resulted from a combination of two main factors: (1) the confusion
that followed in the wake of Bush v. Gore regarding how problematic
voting machines impact fundamental voting rights and notions of
equal protection and (2) the unique nature of this first-ever recall
election and how that allowed greater flexibility to schedule the elec-
tion. These factors came together, like a perfect storm, in a decision
that failed to acknowledge the systematic disenfranchisement of mi-
nority voters, incorrectly applied judicial precedent regarding en-
joining elections in progress, and ultimately allowed practical
considerations to trump a principled legal argument.
A. The Court Refused to Acknowledge Systematic
Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters
On the violation of the Voting Rights Act, the en banc court first
had to consider whether there was a strong probability of success on
the merits. 137 Given the fear and concern the en banc court expressed
at enjoining an election in progress, however, this claim was not given
proper consideration.
In the first appeal, the three-judge panel properly recognized




tern so flawed that California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley had offi-
cially deemed it "unacceptable" and banned its use in all future
elections. 138 This panel recognized the inherent defect in a system
where approximately 40,000 voters cast ballots that would never be
counted because of unreliable voting machines. 139
In addition, the three-judge panel found that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated that those most affected by this disparity were minority
voters.140 The panel was persuaded by the plaintiff's overwhelming sta-
tistics that proved that people of color were more likely to reside in
the counties that have not yet replaced their punch-card voting ma-
chines. The fact that people of color constitute forty-six percent of
punch-card counties but only thirty-two percent of counties using
other more reliable voting systems caused the three-judge panel to
pause and recognize the need to enjoin the October 7 election.141
The judges recognized that this systematic disenfranchisement of mi-
nority voters is specifically precluded by Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. For this reason, the panel held that the plaintiffs properly demon-
strated the likeliness of success on the merits. 142
Despite the facts and overwhelming statistics regarding how pro-
ceeding with the recall would disenfranchise minority voters, the en
banc court reversed the panel's decision and chose to only recognize
that there was a possibility of success and not a strong possibility of
success on the merits. This analytical mistake led the en banc court to
find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the
hardships and considering the public interest.143
In a subsequent analysis of the election, a study demonstrated
that in San Diego County, one of the seven counties that still used
punch-card ballots, an estimated 176,000 votes were "lost" in the recall
election because of the punch-card ballot's flawed design. 144 In addi-
tion, another study that conducted an independent review of the re-
call election results found that "of the 8,359,168 votes cast statewide,
some 384,427 were not recorded for the recall question. Almost half
138. See id. at 888.
139. See id.
140. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 43, Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v.
Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-56498).
141. See id.
142. Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 888.
143. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 919.
144. Roth, supra note 119, at Al. The study cited was conducted by University of Cali-
fornia Berkeley Professor Henry Brady. Id.
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of these residual votes-more than 175,000-were in Los Angeles
County."145
It is vital to recall that the plaintiffs provided the en banc panel
with overwhelming statistics that proved that people of color were
more likely to reside in the counties that had not yet replaced their
punch-card voting machines. This fact was dismissed. In the end, the
results demonstrated that sweeping violations of the Voting Rights Act
occurred, and while the eleven-judge panel on the Ninth Circuit did
not have the benefit of hindsight, they did have adequate statistics and
forecasts that these violations would occur. But instead of merely post-
poning the election until March of the next year when new voting
machines would be available, the court allowed the violations to go
forward, thus refusing to acknowledge the systematic disenfranchise-
ment of minority voters in California.
B. The Court Misapplied Judicial Precedent Regarding Injunctions
in Elections
To determine whether the district court had abused its discretion
in denying the preliminary injunction to halt the recall, the Ninth Cir-
cuit en banc followed precedent in Sports Form, Inc. v, United Press Inter-
national, Inc.146 that held that an order "will be reversed only if the
district court relied on an erroneous legal premise or abused its dis-
cretion."1 47 The Ninth Circuit en banc court began its analysis by rec-
ognizing that there is no doubt that the right to vote is fundamental,
but also recognized that the courts cannot lightly interfere with or
enjoin a state election. 148 This notion was drawn from the Supreme
Court's decision in Reynolds v. Sims. 149 In Reynolds, the Supreme Court
held that the Alabama Legislature's decision to not re-apportion the
legislative districts between 1901 and 1960, despite well-documented
changes in demographics, was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.150 When crafting a remedy for this violation, however, the
Court noted, "where an impending election is imminent and a State's
election machinery is already in progress, equitable considerations
might justify a court in withholding the granting of immediately effec-
145. Id.
146. 686 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1982).
147. Id. at 752.
148. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 918 (citing Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 555, 585 (1964)).
149. Id.
150. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
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tive relief in a legislative apportionment case."151 The Court specifically
limited itself by adopting the words "might justify" and by narrowly
tailoring the statement to situations where "legislative apportionment"
constitutes the constitutional violation. Despite the limits of the hold-
ing in Reynolds, the Ninth Circuit utilized the case as standing for the
proposition that "a federal court cannot lightly interfere with or en-
join a state election." 152
Against this improper backdrop of fear that the en banc court
expressed at enjoining an election in progress, the court incorrectly
followed the judicial trend towards allowing elections in progress to
proceed. Citing a string of cases in which the Supreme Court over-
looked undisputed constitutional violations,1 53 the court reasoned
that the decision to enjoin an impending election has often been
treated as more serious than remedying a known constitutional viola-
tion.154 This flawed analysis set the stage for a wrongly reasoned
decision.
The en banc Ninth Circuit court cited Ely v. Klahr,1 55 where the
United States Supreme Court affirmed a three-judge United States
District Court decision to allow legislative elections to go forth despite
a finding that the apportionment plan used for that election was inva-
lid. 156 The concern regarding the apportionment plan in Ely was that
it "creates legislative districts that are grossly unequal" due to a mis-
conception regarding the then-current population distribution in Ari-
zona. 157 Relying on the fact that the results of the 1970 census would
allow the legislature to adopt a valid apportionment statute in the
next elections in 1972, the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's decision to allow the election to proceed. 158
The Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project court also looked to
Whitcomb v. Chavis159 where the Supreme Court stayed the decision of
a three-judge panel of the District Court that held that the legislative
apportionment statutes of Indiana were unconstitutional and void.1 60
The district court in that case held that the statutes operated to mini-
151. Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
152. Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 917.
153. See, e.g., Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108 (1971); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 396 U.S. 1055
(1970); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
154. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 918.
155. 403 U.S. at 113.
156. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 918.
157. Ely, 403 U.S. at 111.
158. Id. at 115.
159. 396 U.S. 1055 (1970).
160. See Chavis v. Whitcomb, 307 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
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mize the voting strength of a cognizable racial minority group and
therefore ordered a redistricting of the entire state by October 1,
1969.161 On February 2, 1970, the Supreme Court granted the State of
Indiana a stay, allowing the election to proceed despite the alleged
constitutional violations.1 62 Finally, the court considered Kilgarlin v.
Texas,163 a case where the district court allowed a 1966 election to pro-
ceed despite a finding that Fourteenth Amendment rights were vio-
lated in some districts due to unacceptable variations in the
population per representative.16 4
These cases stand for the proposition that there are certain
cases-those involving constitutional violations of legislative appor-
tionment schemes-in which the courts will favor allowing an election
to proceed in the face of constitutional violations. These cases, how-
ever, all involve legislative re-districting, a complex and involved pro-
position, whereas the appellants in Southwest Voter Registration Educ.
Project v. Shelley were merely requesting a short postponement of a re-
call election for five months until the voting machines could be
brought up to the requirements imposed by the Secretary of State.
The difference is significant. The cases the court relied upon to
deny the injunction involve complex schemes to properly divide a leg-
islative district based upon constantly changing populations. Never-
theless, the case at bar did not involve judicial intervention to re-draw
district lines, it merely requested a five month time delay in a special
election.
In Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, the court misapplied
the Supreme Court's reasoning with regard to legislative apportion-
ment cases despite the plaintiffs' argument that "there is a world of
difference between briefly postponing a recall and Proposition elec-
tion that might (but might not) result in a governor's early exit from
office, and postponing a regularly scheduled election to fill offices
that otherwise would not be filled."1 65 The plaintiffs' contention was
that the judicial proclivity to avoid enjoining impending elections was
borne from a concern that without timely elections there would be a
constitutional crisis, either by leaving vacancies in government offices
or by extending the amount of time elected officials served. 166 This
0 161. 396 U.S. at 1055.
162. See id.
163. 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
164. Id.
165. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 5, Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v.
Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-56498).
166. See id.
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was never a possibility with this election. In fact, if the election was
enjoined, the constitutional crisis the en banc panel appeared to fear
would never have occurred. Governor Davis would have remained in
his position until the voting machines could be replaced and the Pro-
positions would have appeared on the March 2004 ballot for which
they were originally intended.
By ignoring the unique element of this first-ever recall election in
California, the court placed too much weight on the judicial prece-
dent that favored allowing elections in progress to proceed. In so do-
ing, the court allowed an election to proceed that could have easily
been postponed until the constitutional and statutory violations were
resolved by replacement of the unreliable voting machines.
C. The Court Heavily Relied on Practical Considerations and
Ignored Legal Principles
The balancing test invoked by the en banc panel, strangely remi-
niscent of Bush v. Gore, focused significantly on the resources that the
state of California and its citizens had invested in the recall elec-
tion. 167 Specifically, the court expressed concern that time and money
had already been spent to prepare voter pamphlets and sample bal-
lots, to mail absentee ballots, and to train poll workers. 168 The court
noted that public officials had been forced to divert their attention
from official duties to campaign and recognized that candidates had
crafted a message to voters in light of a schedule and calibrated that
message to the political and social environment of the time. 169 Fur-
ther, the court noted that the candidates had raised funds under con-
tribution laws and expanded them in reliance on the election
occurring on October 7, 2003.170 Next, the court looked at the hun-
dreds of thousands of absentee voters who already cast their ballots,
used their time and money to exercise their citizenship rights.' 71 The
court was compelled by the notion that "[t]hese investments of time,
money, and the exercise of citizenship rights cannot be returned."172
The court reasoned that if the election were to be postponed, the
citizens who already made an investment of the election would essen-
tially be told that their votes do not count and they must vote again.
1 73
167. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003).
168. See id.





INJUNCTIONS AND ELECTIONSSpring 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
On the other side of the balancing equation, the en banc court
merely held that the plaintiffs claims that the punch-card system
would deny the right to vote to some voters were "merely a speculative
possibility . . .that any such denial will influence the result of the
election.' 74 The court never considered the reality that the 40,000
voters whose votes would not be counted were being told that their
votes do not count at all. This is a very different proposition than tell-
ing an absentee voter that they would have the opportunity to vote
again. Thus, the en banc panel, by refusing to postpone the election
for five months, essentially told the minority voters in the seven major
counties that the reality that 40,000 of them would never be given an
opportunity to have their vote count was inconsequential. This flies in
the face of the Supreme Court's assertion in Reynolds v. Sims. "We are
cautioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets and
mathematical quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial of constitution-
ally protected rights demands judicial protection."' 75
This attempt to balance the harms was not a true balance at all.
The court merely enumerated the practical difficulties in halting the
recall as significant and considered the inevitable disenfranchisement
of minority voters on the other side merely speculative. Rather than
dealing with the concrete reality that 40,000 votes of primarily minor-
ity voters would not be counted, the panel chose to predict the future
and determine that since the votes might not affect the outcome, the
practical problems of halting the election outweighed the disen-
franchisement. This en banc panel improperly held that despite their
finding that there was a possibility of success on the merits of the Vot-
ing Rights Act violation, 76 the material hardship that the State of Cali-
fornia would suffer from postponing the recall outweighed the
possibility of systematic discrimination.
This poor balancing act resulted in an election that utterly disre-
garded the Supreme Court's declaration in Gray v. Sanders, which was
cited by the Bush v. Gore Court: "The Court has consistently recog-
nized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right
'to cast their ballots and have them counted' .... Every voter's vote is
entitled to be counted once. It must be correctly counted and re-
ported."l77 Maybe, according to the Ninth Circuit, every voter's vote is
entitled to be counted-except for when it's not.
174. Id. at 919-20.
175. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
176. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 917.




A multitude of questions remain following the decision of South-
west Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley. If Bush v. Gore stood for the
proposition that every vote deserved to be counted equally, then how
could it be equitable to allow an election to proceed in the face of
massive voting machine failures? How important is the nature of the
particular election to the application of judicial precedent discourag-
ing enjoining impending elections? And, most importantly, when it
comes to elections, are we truly concerned with protecting the integ-
rity of the process or merely allowing practical reasons to rule the day?
The reasoning of Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project would instruct
us that every vote counts, except when it doesn't; the uniqueness of
the recall election was irrelevant; and it is totally acceptable to craft an
argument relying on whether the application of the law to this situa-
tion would result in too great a practical hardship rather than relying
on sound legal principles. If the court had applied this type of weak
reasoning to some of the most important decisions of our time, our
children might still be going to segregated schools simply because it
would be more convenient. The role of the judiciary, as stated by the
Supreme Court, is to protect constitutionally protected rights-the
decision in Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project falls short of that
mandate.
In the future, when courts are grappling with elections and issu-
ing injunctions to prevent constitutional and statutory violations, the
courts must factor in what type of election is involved and what exactly
is at stake. In balancing the likelihood of success on the merits with
the hardships of issuing the injunction, the courts must recognize that
the right to vote is so fundamental that the hardships that would fol-
low from issuing an injunction should be more significant than merely
having to re-send absentee ballots and require candidates to campaign
longer.
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